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ARBITRAL AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS:
INDISTINGUISHABLE JUSTICE
OR JUSTICE DENIED?

PatK Chew*

INTRODUCTION

The year 1991 was a watershed year for the development of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). Section 118 of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act ("1991 Act")1 encouraged ADR for civil rights disputes,
including employment discrimination complaints. This statutory
endorsement of ADR, in combination with the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,' helped fuel its
popularity.
Today, employers use ADR extensively; some companies even
use mandatory arbitration for the resolution of all employment
disputes. At the same time, legislators, employers, employees, and
academics debate the advantages and disadvantages of ADR.
Supporters note the many benefits of ADR, such as time and cost
savings; skeptics point to substantial concerns, especially the
fairness of mandatory arbitration agreements for employees. Given
the pervasive use of ADR in the workplace, this debate is not merely
theoretical.
This Article contributes to the debate by exploring the
contributions of empirical research on ADR, made increasingly
4
feasible because of large emerging databases on arbitrations. In
particular, researchers have been comparing outcomes of ADR
processes and judicial processes. If the research indicates employeeplaintiffs are faring poorly in ADR processes in comparison to how
they fare in court cases, then ADR is comparatively disadvantageous
* Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, University of
Pittsburgh. I thank Wendy Parker and the Wake Forest Law Review for
inviting me to participate in this Symposium. I am grateful to the participants
in a faculty work-in-progress workshop at the University of Pittsburgh, and to
Robert Kelley and Deborah Brake for their insightful suggestions for improving
the Article. I am also indebted to Conor M. Shaffer, Ashley O'Keefe, Marc
Silverman, and Karen Shephard for their excellent research assistance.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081,
1081 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
2. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part III.
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to employees.
If, instead, employees are more successful in
arbitration than in litigation, then ADR is comparatively
advantageous to plaintiffs.
Earlier research indicated that
employees were more successful in arbitrations, but more recent and
comprehensive research reaches contrary conclusions.
This Article posits that the next stage of empirical research
should add a careful analysis of arbitral opinions to a study of
outcomes.
This qualitative analysis illuminates the reasoning
processes that lead to judges' and arbitrators' decisions. This Article
offers an original exploratory study of racial harassment cases, an
important subset of employment discrimination cases, comparing
both the outcomes in arbitration and litigation with the arbitrators'
and judges' decision-making processes. Consistent with more recent
research on employment arbitration, this study finds that employees
fare worse in arbitration than in litigation of racial harassment
disputes. It also discovers that arbitrators' and judges' decision
making is strikingly similar, at least as indicated by their written
opinions. This discovery is ironic given that ADR, as its name
suggests, was envisioned as a substantive and procedural
alternative to litigation-that is, a truly distinguishable form of
justice.
Part I reviews Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. and
section 118 of the 1991 Act. The Supreme Court's endorsement of
ADR in Gilmer and Congress's expressed support for ADR in
employment discrimination cases under section 118 together
provided significant impetus to ADR's development.
Part II
explains the debate over ADR. While there are clear efficiency
benefits, ADR also presents substantial fairness concerns for
employees. Part III discusses how empirical research can contribute
to this debate, particularly considering existing studies on outcomes
in arbitration as compared to litigation. Part IV turns to the core of
the Article-an innovative quantitative and qualitative analysis of
racial harassment arbitrations and judicial proceedings.
I. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL EVENTS IN 1991

While it may not have been apparent at the time, the
combination of a landmark Supreme Court case and the inclusion of
an ADR provision in major civil rights legislation became a powerful
impetus for the growth of ADR. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp. was a judicial invitation and section 118 of the 1991 Act7 was
a legislative invitation to employers to use ADR. As discussed in
Part II, these invitations were enthusiastically accepted.

5. See infra Part IV.
6. 500 U.S. 20.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081,
1081 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Roger Gilmer, a manager at a financial corporation, was fired at
the age of sixty-two." He claimed age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 19679 ("ADEA") and tried to
sue his employer in federal court. 0 His employer argued that he
had waived his right to judicial process and had instead agreed to
arbitrate the dispute.n As part of his job, Gilmer had been required
to register as a securities representative with the New York Stock
The registration application included a
Exchange ("NYSE").12
provision providing that any employment dispute would be resolved
in arbitration under NYSE rules."
Gilmer had some strong arguments for nonenforceability of the
His dispute was based on a federal
arbitration agreement."
antidiscrimination statute, and thereby reflected important national
policy objectives." It was unclear whether he was even aware of the
arbitration agreement until he tried to bring his claim in court. As
an employee, he had less bargaining power than his employer, and
that disparity in power would likely continue in arbitral
proceedings. Gilmer also argued that since his employer had
unilaterally drafted the agreement, the arbitration's procedures
unfairly favored the employer.16
Despite Gilmer's arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that
the agreement was enforceable and that Gilmer was not allowed to
It indicated that these generalized
proceed in the courts.17
arguments against ADR and arbitration were "insufficient" to
override the arbitration provision.'" The Court made clear that
statutory claims would be arbitrable, unless legislators expressly9
indicated that the claims should only be resolved in the courts.'
Indeed, the Court heralded the benefits of arbitration, signaling the
20
presumption of enforceability of these arrangements in the future.
As stated by Justice White: "[Bly agreeing to arbitrate, a party
'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom
2
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.'" '

A.

8.
9.
U.S.C.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602, 602 (codified as amended at 29
§ 621 (2006)).
Id. at 23-24.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 27-35.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 26.

20. See id.
21. Id. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
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Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed that a mandatory arbitration
agreement constituted a waiver of an employee's right to a judicial
forum."
Furthermore, while Gilmer's claim dealt with age
discrimination, the Court's holding has been widely applied to all
kinds of claims, including other employment discrimination
disputes.
B.

Section 118 of the 1991 Act
While Gilmer was winding its way through the judicial system,
the 1991 Act and its 1990 predecessor were similarly winding their
way through intense congressional debates. 24 The Supreme Court
decided Gilmer on May 13, 1991, when the 1991 Act was in
committee. While public and scholarly attention were focused on
the substantive provisions of the 1991 Act, the legislation also
included a provision on ADR. Section 118 of the 1991 Act provides:
"Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising
under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title."
While the 1991 Act's overall purpose was to strengthen employees'
rights,27 section 118's purpose was to accommodate those parties
concerned with the prospect that the legislation's substantive
provisions would open the floodgates to litigation.28 In retrospect,
the passage of section 118 and the federal courts' interpretation of
its meaning had important consequences on the development of
ADR.

Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
22. Id. at 23.
23. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 364-65 (7th Cir.
1997) (employment discrimination claims); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (disability discrimination
claim); Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1457 (D. Minn.
1996) (race discrimination claim).
24. Gilmer was argued on January 14, 1991, and decided on May 13, 1991.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20. The 1991 Act was enacted on Nov. 21, 1991. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2, 4, and 16 U.S.C.).
25. Angelito Remo Sevilla, The End of Duffield and the Rise of Mandatory
Arbitration: How Courts Misinterpreted the Civil Rights Act's Arbitration
Provision, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 350 (2005).
26. Civil Rights Act § 118.
27. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 1 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.

694, 694 (stating that the purpose of the 1991 Act is to "strengthen existing
protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws to provide
more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of
discrimination").
28. See id. at 78 (recognizing that the 1991 Act would increase litigation
and encourage ADR under section 118).
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The Supreme Court in Gilmer explained that Congress could
overcome the presumption of the enforceability of an ADR
agreement by expressly indicating that claims brought under a
statute could not be resolved in ADR.29 Section 118 did not
expressly preclude ADR for the resolution of employment
discrimination claims. On the contrary, the plain language of
section 118 encouraged ADR. Substantial evidence in the legislative
history, however, shows that section 118 only had voluntary ADR in
mind.o In other words, legislators were not endorsing mandatory
arbitration agreements.' In addition, as Judge Reinhardt observes
in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.," it is inherently
inconsistent to read section 118 as allowing involuntary waivers of
jury trial when it is part of a statute intended to provide plaintiffs
with a greater choice of forums and remedies."
Despite the variation in possible readings of the statute, federal
courts, however, focused on section 118's plain language.34 In
Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth," for instance, the court
considered the effect of section 118 on Gilmer's holding of the
enforceability of a mandatory arbitration agreement: "We find
nothing in [section 1181 which can be construed as modifying or
undermining the holding of Gilmer. Indeed, if anything, the
opposite is true; i.e., arbitration is an alternative to litigation
expressly encouraged by the statute."3 6 Numerous other courts

29. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
30. Sevilla, supra note 25, at 345-49. There is ample legislative history
indicating that Congress's encouragement of ADR was intended to supplement
and not to supplant legal rights and remedies, and that parties' use of ADR was
intended only to be voluntary. Id.; see also EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton,
& Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2002) (Pregerson, J., dissenting)
(discussing the legislative history of section 118).
31. Sevilla, supra note 25, at 345.
32. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton, & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
33. Id. at 1192-93.
34. See Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir.
1998) (relying on section 118 to find that Title VII claims are arbitrable, and
concluding that the text defeats some contrary legislative history); Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881-82 (4th Cir.
1996) (stating that despite the legislative history of section 118, plaintiff failed
to show that Congress intended to preclude mandatory arbitration of Title VII
claims); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 503-04
(E.D. Mich. 1997) (enforcing compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims
"notwithstanding the legislative history of [the 1991 Act]" because the plaintiff
failed to show Congress intended to preclude voluntary agreements to arbitrate
such claims), rev'd, 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Hubbard Broad.,
Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447, 1457 (D. Minn. 1996) (concluding that section 118
"reveals express congressional approval for the use of arbitration to resolve
Title VII disputes").
35. 642 A.2d 1299 (D.C. 1994).
36. Id. at 1304.
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followed the same reasoning. Thus, while section 118 might have
been viewed as a legislative barrier to the enforcement of mandatory
arbitration agreements, it was interpreted instead as legislative
reinforcement of the strong endorsement of mandatory arbitration
agreements in Gilmer. Rather than chilling the growth of ADR,
section 118 of the 1991 Act, in combination with Gilmer, helped fuel
its expansion.
II. EXPANSIvE USE OF ADR AND THE ENSUING DEBATE

A.

ADR Development and Use
While no study has fully documented the extent of ADR in the
United States, its use has increased steadily in recent decades, and
it is now widely used in resolving all kinds of disputes, including
employment disputes."
The most common forms of ADR are
arbitration and mediation." This Article focuses on the employment
arbitration process because there the most substantial amount of
information exists about its outcomes, although as subsequently
discussed,40 that information is not comprehensive of all
arbitrations.
To illustrate businesses' current and extensive use of
arbitration, consider that an estimated six million employees are
covered by American Arbitration Association ("AAA") arbitration
plans.4
Approximately one-third of nonunion employees use
arbitration rather than litigation as the primary means for resolving
their employment disputes. 42 As a comparison, the number of
nonunion employment arbitration proceedings is reportedly greater
than those covered by union representation.
In addition, while the exact numbers are not known, many
37. See sources cited supra note 34.
38. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:
Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2011)

[hereinafter Colvin, Case Outcomes]; Alexander J.S. Colvin, EmpiricalResearch

on Employment Arbitration:Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTs.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 408-12 (2007) [hereinafter Colvin, Sound and Fury]; David
B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control: The CorporateEmbrace of

ADR, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 134-36 (1998); Peter B. Rutledge, Whither
Arbitration?,6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 549, 553-55 (2008).
39. Caroline Harris Crowne, Note, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigmof Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768, 1772
(2001); see also Dispute Resolution Services, AM. ARB. ASs'N, http://www.adr.org

/drs (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (describing its mediation and arbitration
services).
40. See infra Part III.
41. The AAA report includes over 61,000 employer and consumer cases
administered by the AAA since 2003. Consumer Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS'N,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22042 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
42. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38, at 2.
43. Id.
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companies presumably use mandatory ADR plans." As illustrated
in Gilmer, these plans compel employees to use ADR to resolve their
disputes, even if those employees prefer judicial adjudication.
Furthermore, the terms of the ADR process are typically determined
by employers unilaterally, with the employees' acceptance of these
terms being a requirement of employment.
Debate over ADR, Given Both Its Benefits and Concerns
ADR's popularity is not surprising, given its many benefits.
ADR is commonly perceived to be cheaper and faster than litigation,
and that perception turns out to be generally true.46 ADR thus saves
both employers' and employees' time and money. The increased use
of ADR also diverts disputes that would otherwise go to the courts,
thus unclogging crowded judicial dockets and saving taxpayers'
dollars.
ADR's theoretical appeal goes beyond these efficiencies. As its
name suggests, ADR was conceived as an alternative to litigation,
with its own distinct substantive and procedural characteristics.
The intention was to create a less formal forum than litigation.
Arbitrators, subject to the instructions of the parties, analyze the
dispute and reach a solution that should reflect the actual needs and
interests of the parties. In other words, unless the parties specify
otherwise, arbitrators are not bound to resolve the dispute according
to legal precedents or principles. They can, for instance, apply

B.

44. See Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 38; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
MandatoryArbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635-42 (2005); supra

note 34 (citing cases in which employers are seeking enforcement of their
mandatory arbitration policies).
45. State courts have recognized very limited contractual attacks on these
agreements. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 679 (Cal. 2000) (stating that arbitration agreements in employment
contracts may only be challenged on the same grounds as other contracts);
Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 107-08 (Ill. 2006) (stating that
arbitration agreements must be held to a standard no higher than other
contracts).
46. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment

Arbitration at Gilmer's Quinceahiera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 342-46 (2006)
(summarizing research on speed and costs of arbitration); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: EmpiricalEvidence, 41 U.

MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 815-16 (2008) (discussing the costs of arbitration
compared

to litigation);

Lewis L.

Maltby, Private Justice: Employment

Arbitrationand Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 29, 55 (1998) (noting
that arbitration is faster than litigation).
47. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow is an eloquent spokesperson for this
vision of ADR. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary
System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 12
(1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 763-64 (1984); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland Democratic
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2664-65 (1995).
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standards of the industry, their contractual understanding, or
simply what they consider appropriate and fair. Arbitration
procedures also are intended to be less burdensome than judicial
procedures. Arbitrations are generally not subject to the discovery
or evidentiary rules of federal courts. Likewise, legal representation
of the parties is optional. Therefore, in theory, the parties can shape
the process and the arbitrators can tailor the outcome, instead of
subjecting everyone to the rigid procedural rules and limited
remedies of the judicial system.
Skeptics of ADR, however, have identified myriad concerns that
have prompted considerable scholarly and political debate. 8
Employees' agreements to arbitrate all disputes with their
employers may be contained in seldom-read company policy
manuals or imbedded in multipage employment contracts.
Employees may have "agreed" to ADR without deliberate
consideration or even conscious knowledge of the terms. Even if
employees are aware of an ADR agreement, they may not fully
appreciate that they are effectively waiving their future rights to a
judicial resolution of all employment disputes.
Skeptics also suggest that ADR processes, given their
informality, may result in inherent disadvantages for the less
powerful party. 49 In the typical employer-employee dispute, an
employee would have fewer resources, less bargaining power, less
expertise, and less experience in arguing his or her positions. At the
same time, the impact of these disadvantages is exacerbated by the
absence of formal rules of civil procedure designed to assure a fair
hearing and consideration of each party's position.o The selection
48. See Richard A. Bales, Beyond the Protocol: Recent Trends in
Employment Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 301, 303 (2007)

(discussing "contract-formation issues, barriers to entry, access issues, remedies
issues, and judicial review" related to employment arbitration); Bales, supra
note 46, at 359-90 (describing arguments against arbitration); Maltby, supra
note 46, at 32-34 (describing employer manipulation of the arbitration process
for employers' advantage); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and
Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1252 (2009) (describing mandatory
employment arbitration as inherently unfair); David Sherwyn, Samuel
Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration:A
New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563-64 (2005)

(summarizing policy concerns for and against arbitration); Sternlight, supra
note 44, at 1648-58 (describing both attacks and defenses of mandatory
arbitration); Darren P. Lindamood, Comment, Redressing the Arbitration
Process:An Alternative to the ArbitrationFairnessAct of 2009, 45 WAKE FOREST

L. REV. 291, 294-95 (2010) (describing legislative attempt to invalidate
predispute employment arbitration agreements).
49. Classic pieces espouse this position. See Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairnessand Formality:Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1400; Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1586-88 (1991).

50. However, various model procedural rules have been offered in response
to these concerns.

See, e.g., Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation
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process for arbitrators and information on their particular
qualifications are also not easily determinable, in contrast to the
extensive judicial selection process and widely available information
Finally, arbitration awards are
about the judges themselves.
generally final and binding, and judicial review of arbitral
*
very rare. 51
proceedingsd*is
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON ARBITRATIONS

Two decades ago, when section 118 was promulgated and
Gilmer was decided, little empirical information existed on
arbitrations. Now, while research on arbitrations is still limited, a
rich initial body of information is emerging that can be empirically
studied.52 Since researchers are also actively analyzing litigation
outcomes," basic comparisons between the two forms of dispute
resolution are feasible.
A.

Challenges of Arbitration Studies
Judicial proceedings of employment disputes are ordinarily
public, and judicial opinions are widely reported.54 In contrast,
employment arbitrations are ordinarily private proceedings in which
the parties have agreed to confidentiality about the identities of the
In fact, privacy and
parties, the issues, and the outcome.'
confidentiality are key attractions for ADR users." Furthermore,
arbitrators may not document their analysis and reasoning at all, or
may do so only in a cursory fashion. Therefore, historically, a
Procedures, AM. ARB. Ass'N (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904
[hereinafter AAA Rules].
51. Monica J. Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory
Employment Disputes: Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74

N.Y.U. L. REV. 844, 848-55 (1999) (discussing limited judicial review of arbitral
awards); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (enumerating the limited grounds on
which arbitral awards may be vacated).
52. See infra Part III.A.
53. E.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge:
An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117,

1121 (2009) [hereinafter Chew & Kelley, Color-Blind Judge]; Pat K. Chew &
Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 49, 53-55 (2006) [hereinafter Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping];Kevin M.
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv. L & POL'Y REV. 103, 103 (2009);
Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81
NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 889, 893 (2006).

54. Judicial opinions have long been readily accessible through published
federal reporter systems and electronic information sources such as LexisNexis
and Westlaw. Utilizing these resources, researchers have conducted numerous
studies of employment law litigation cases, including employment
discrimination cases. See supranote 53.
55. See AAA Rules, supra note 50. In contrast, some accounts of nonemployment law arbitrations, such as labor arbitrations, are accessible.
56. Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 38, at 139 tbl.1.
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comprehensive body of employment arbitrations and arbitral
opinions has not been publicly available. Thus, conducting any kind
of comprehensive research of employment arbitrations, including
their outcomes, had not been possible. Accounts of employment
arbitration proceedings instead tended to be anecdotal or based on
select convenience samples. Until recently, empirical research by
necessity was also limited to these select samples.
As of 2003, California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.96
significantly altered the situation by requiring providers of ADR
services to report basic information about consumer arbitrations and
other forms of ADR." Employee-employer disputes that are subject
to employer-promulgated ADR programs are considered "consumer"
arbitrations. California 1281.96 requires that ADR providers file
the following information: the employer, arbitrator, filing date and
date of decision, amounts of claims, amounts awarded, and fees. 0
Providers do not have to identify the employee, the state, the legal
basis of the claim, the basis of the arbitrator's decision, or the
arbitral opinion if one was written.6 1 The AAA responded to the law
with extensive filings on all its employment arbitration cases under
employer-promulgated procedures.62
Its filings include all
employment cases administered nationally, not just those in
California. As the largest ADR provider in the country, AAA filings
contain a remarkable database of cases, consisting of over 61,000
disputes.63 Other providers of arbitration services in California are
also subject to these filing requirements, and their reports are
valuable sources of information."
Keep in mind, however, that these California 1281.6 reports do
not capture the universe of employment arbitration cases, although
they do represent a huge number of employment arbitrations.
These reports only cover employer-promulgated arbitrations,
typically under company-wide grievance programs. Arbitrations
occurring under ADR agreements negotiated between individual
employees and their employers are not included in this database.
(Presumably, these individually negotiated agreements are with
higher-salaried executive employees with some bargaining power,

57. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38, at 2 (noting the limited
databases available in conducting past research).
58. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing examples of past research).
59. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (Deering 2011).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38, at 3.
63. Consumer Statistics, Am. ARB. ASS'N, supra note 41.
64. For examples, see Arbitration Disclosures, JUDICATE W.,
httpJ/www.judicatewest.com/library/disclosures (last visited Apr. 4, 2011), and
California CCP 1281.96 Reports, NAT'L ARB. F., http/www.adrforum.com/main
.aspx?itemlD=563&hideBar=False&navlD=188&news=3 (last visited Apr. 4,
2011).
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while the employer-promulgated ADR agreements are with all
remaining employees with lower salaries who do not have the same
individual bargaining power.)6 Finally, some arbitrations are not
administered by an ADR provider and therefore are not subject to
California 1281.6.6
Given this new source of information, researchers are studying
arbitrations in more detail.
Most relevant to this Article,
researchers have begun to study the outcomes of employment
arbitrations." They are also comparing employment arbitration
outcomes to employment litigation outcomes," and inferring from
those findings
whether arbitration
is advantageous
or
disadvantageous to employees.6 ' Note, however, that there are
caveats to comparing arbitration outcomes to litigation outcomes.o
For instance, employees' "wins" or "losses" in arbitration studies are
distinguishable from their "wins" or "losses" in litigation studies.
Arbitrations are typically final resolutions of the dispute. In
contrast, most judicial opinions in litigation studies are resolutions
of employers' motions for summary judgment or other pretrial
motions.71
Employees' "wins" or "losses" in these judicial
proceedings do not technically mean a final resolution of the dispute,
although the court's granting of employers' motions for summary
judgment precludes employees from a trial.
B.

IllustrativeStudies

Earlier arbitration studies were based on data obtained before
California 1281.6 existed.72 These studies found that employees
65. See Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration:A FairForum at Low
Cost, DisP. REsOL. J., May/July 2003, at 1, 3.
66. Civ. PRoc. § 1281.96 provides that "any private arbitration company
that administers or is otherwise involved in, a consumer arbitration" is subject
to the reporting requirement.
67. E.g., Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38; Colvin, Sound and Fury,
supra note 38, at 412-37.
68. Colvin, Sound and Fury, supra note 38, at 414-27.
69. If employees are more likely to lose in arbitration than in litigation, the
inference is that arbitration is disadvantageous to employees and less protective
of their rights. Similarly, if employees are more likely to win in arbitration
than in litigation, the inference is that arbitration is not disadvantageous, and
is perhaps even beneficial, to employees.
70. See Bales, supra note 46, at 342 (reviewing studies on outcomes, costs,
etc., plus normative analysis, although there also are acknowledged caveats to
using such analysis); Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38, at 6-7; Schwartz,
supra note 48, at 1284-86.
71. See, e.g., Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping, supra note 53, at 78 tbl.10
(showing that 79.1% of the district court opinions and 73.6% of the appellate
court opinions in their study of racial harassment cases were issued on motions
for summary judgment).
72. E.g., Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Vindicate Their Rights?,
DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 56, 56 (comparing outcomes in
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fared well in arbitrations, winning employment disputes between
Based on these results, researchers
40% and 75% of the time.
concluded that arbitration was not disadvantageous for employees.
In fact, some extolled the virtues of the arbitral process for
employees.74 However, these pre-California 1281.6 data sets were
often selective, rather than comprehensive or random samples of
cases, thus limiting the extent one could generalize from these
studies. These studies also tended to combine arbitrations pursuant
to individually negotiated ADR agreements and arbitrations
pursuant to employer-promulgated ADR plans.
Professor Elizabeth Hill's research illustrates the transition to
more randomly selected data sets, but still contains caveats
regarding its generalizations.
Working under the auspices of the
AAA, she studied 200 arbitration awards randomly selected from
356 employment dispute cases decided between January 1, 1999,
and November 5, 2000.76 While Hill randomly selected her cases, it
was not clear if the 356 cases from which she drew were all the AAA
employment arbitration cases or a subset. She found a 43% overall
employee success rate.77
Employees in employer-promulgated
mandatory arbitrations had a 34% success rate, compared to
employees' 57% success
rate in individually negotiated
arbitrations." Hill's overall conclusion was that "AAA employment
arbitration is affordable and substantially fair to employees,
including those employees at the lower end of the income scale."
The results of Hill's study can also be compared to results of
studies of employment law litigation.80 Employee success rates in
litigation vary depending on the characteristics of the study. In one
study of 1430 employment discrimination cases heard in the federal
courts from 1999 to 2000, the researchers found an employee success
employment cases in New York federal courts and securities arbitrations).
Articles summarizing past empirical research include: Bales, supra note 46;
Maltby, supra note 46; Schwartz, supra note 48; Sherwyn et al., supra note 48;
Sternlight, supra note 44; Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical
and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OIo ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 735 (2001).

73. See Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38, at 4.
74. See, e.g., Delikat & Kleiner, supra note 72, at 58; Hill, supra note 65, at
4-5.
75. Hill's research study has been reported in the following sources:
Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitrationand Litigationof Employment
Claims:An Empirical Comparison, DIsP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 44;
Hill, supra note 65; Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical
Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American
ArbitrationAssociation, 18 OH. ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 777 (2003).

76. Hill, supra note 65, at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 1.
80. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 53; Colvin, Case Outcomes,
supra note 38, at 5-7; Parker, supra note 53.

2011]

ARBITRAL AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

197

rate of 36.4%.8'
In contrast, their study of 160 state court
employment discrimination cases in 1996 found a 43.8% employee
812
success rate. Finally, in a recent study of U.S. district court cases,
plaintiffs won 28% of employment discrimination cases that went to
trial." An average employee success rate of 36% from these three
studies gives us a reference point for employees' success rate in
litigation.
FIGURE 1

Forms of Dispute Resolution and Case
Outcomes
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Professor Alexander Colvin's work represents the emerging
research based on the vast comprehensive database of AAA cases
made possible since the passage of California 1281.6.8 He analyzed
all cases of employer-promulgated arbitrations from 2003 through
2007, consisting of 3945 arbitration cases covering an array of
Removing cases that were settled or
employment disputes."5
withdrawn left 1213 cases that resulted in awards.8 6 This study
captures a large storehouse of information.
Colvin found that employees did not fare well, winning in only
21.4% of the cases." This finding was distinctive in at least two
ways. First, this rate is a lower employee success rate than was
81. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 75, at 48 tbl.1.
82. Id.
83. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 53, at 129.
84. See generally Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38.
85. In 82.4% of the cases, employees made less than $100,000 per year. Id.
at 10.
86. One thousand six hundred and forty-seven mediation cases were not
studied. Id. at 4.
87. Id. at 6.
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found in prior studies on employment arbitrations, including the one
by Elizabeth Hill." Second, this 21.4% employee success rate is less
than the employee success rate in litigation studies.8 ' Thus, Colvin's
research does not suggest that arbitrations are advantageous for
employee plaintiffs, at least as measured by the outcomes of the
proceedings. Instead, the inference is that arbitration may be
disadvantageous to employees.
To the benefit of both parties, Colvin did find that arbitrations
resolved disputes in a timelier manner than litigation.90 To the
benefit of employees, arbitration fees were also typically paid by
employers. 91 However, the amount of the awards was substantially
lower than the amounts reported in employment litigation. Colvin
also found strong evidence of repeat player effects.
Employees'
success rate and award amounts were significantly lower when
employers had previously been involved in multiple arbitration
cases. Employers presumably benefit from their accumulated
expertise and experience, in contrast to the comparable lack of
expertise and experience of the one-time employee claimant.
Furthermore, Colvin found significant repeat employer-arbitrator
pairing effects. Employees on average have lower success rates and
award amounts when the same arbitrator is selected in more than
one case involving the same employer.
In summary, earlier empirical research on arbitrations of
employment disputes indicated that employees fared well in
arbitration, relative to employees in litigation. More recent research
based on data acquired after the passage of California section
1281.6, however, questions the generalizations of these earlier
studies.
Colvin's large-scale study of employer-promulgated
arbitrations found that employees have worse success rates in
employment arbitrations than in litigation.
As the following
discussion explores, the type of employment claim can also make a
significant difference.
IV. Focus ON RACIAL HARASSMENT CASES
Empirical research can be either quantitative or qualitative,
with each type producing valuable but distinctive scholarship." The
88. See supra notes 72-73, 76-78, and accompanying text. Recall, however,
that these other studies' results may have been affected by their inclusion of
both employer-promulgated and individually negotiated ADR agreements.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
90. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38, at 8.
91. Id. at 9.
92. Id. at 21.
93. Id.

94. NoRMAN K. DENZIN & YVONNA S. LINcoLN, Introduction: The Discipline
and Practiceof QualitativeResearch, in HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE REsEARcH 1,
10-12 (2002). For characteristics of both methods, see generally JOHN W.
CRESWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE, QUANTITATIVE, AND MIXED METHODS
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empirical research of both arbitration and litigation, as described
above, has tended to be quantitative, focusing on readily identifiable
variables that can be objectively and numerically measured," such
as the outcome of cases (whether the claimant is successful or not),
the amount of the remedy (in dollars), or the race and gender of the
judge. The goal is to test hypotheses about the relationship between
variables."
Qualitative empirical research instead systematically analyzes
the content of the arbitrations and judicial proceedings, identifying
patterns or themes. The qualitative method investigates the why
and how of judicial and arbitral decision making." Smaller samples
also can be used in qualitative analysis, so long as the samples are
representative.
The qualitative empirical research of judicial decision making
can be based on a very methodical analysis of the content of judicial
opinions. 99 In arbitrations, the arbitrators' reasoning and decision
KEITH F. PUNCH, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
APPROACHES (3d ed. 2009) and
RESEARCH: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACHES (2d ed. 2005).

95. As described by PUNCH, supra note 94, at 237: "The quantitative
approach conceptualizes reality in terms of variables, and relationships
between them.. . . Samples are typically larger than in qualitative studies....
It does not see context as central, typically stripping data from their context."
It is more focused on "making standardized and systematic comparisons,
sketching contours and dimensions. . . ." PUNCH, supranote 94, at 239.
96. For example, the hypothesis that the judges' race is related to the
outcome of cases can be statistically tested. Examples include the research of
Hill, supra text accompanying notes 75-79, and Colvin, supra text
accompanying notes 84-93. They identify the rate at which employees win or
lose in arbitration proceedings to test hypotheses about whether employees are
more or less successful in arbitrations than in court proceedings. See Hill,
supra text accompanying notes 75-79; Colvin, supra text accompanying notes
84-93. As recommended for standard forms of statistical analysis, larger
samples are typically used in quantitative analysis. PUNCH, supra note 94, at
237.
97. PUNCH, supra note 94, at 287. Traditional doctrinal analysis of judicial
opinions is similar to qualitative empirical research in the sense that it closely
studies the content of opinions for the judges' reasoning and decision-making
pattern. Qualitative empirical research, however, is distinct from traditional
doctrinal analysis because it randomly samples judicial opinions to obtain a
representative pool, determines in advance the particular research inquiries
and measures for coding the content, and reaches conclusions based on objective
standards. See CRESWELL, supra note 94, at 190-93 (describing standards for
reliability, validity, and generalizability in well-designed qualitative empirical
research).
98. As described by PUNCH, supra note 94, at 238: "[Tlhe qualitative
approach deals more with cases. It is sensitive to context and process, to lived
experience and to local groundedness, and the researcher tries to get closer to
what is being studied." It focuses on "phenomenon or situation in detail,
holistically and in its context, finding out about the interpretations it has for
the people involved, and about their meanings and purposes, or trying to see
what processes are involved." PUNCH, supra note 94, at 240.
99. These opinions reveal, sometimes in great detail, the judges' analysis of
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making are presumably embodied in arbitral opinions. However,
arbitrators do not always write opinions. They are not legally
required to do so, and the parties may not want or need them. Even
if the arbitrators do write opinions, the opinions are difficult to
access given the typically confidential nature of arbitral proceedings.
As described below, an important recent database of arbitral
opinions of employment disputes has opened the door to qualitative
analysis of the arbitral process.
A.

Analysis of Racial HarassmentDisputes
Existing empirical research, such as Colvin's research described
earlier, has studied employment arbitrations as a whole and
provides a very useful overview of the outcomes of all these cases. It
has not, however, distinguished between the different types of
employment disputes, so any differences between types of disputes
are unknown.
To illustrate how outcomes of a particular
employment discrimination claim might differ from claims as a
whole and to illustrate quantitative versus qualitative empirical
methodology, this Article now presents an exploratory study of
racial harassment disputes. Specifically, this Article compares the
outcomes of these disputes in arbitration versus the outcomes in the
courts, and analyzes the decision-making processes of arbitrators
and judges. Finally, these results are related back to the debate
about ADR's benefits and potential harms.
Racial harassment disputes are a subset of employment
discrimination cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended by the 1991 Act. 00 Similar to sexual harassment claims,
racial harassment claims are based on Title VII's prohibitions of
0 In racial
discrimination based on a protected status.o'
harassment
cases, employee plaintiffs must show that they were harassed
"because of their race" (rather than some non-race-based reason),
and that the harassment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to
alter their job circumstances so that it became a hostile work
environment. 0 2 Employers have affirmative defenses to these
claims. 03

B.

Racial HarassmentCourt Cases
The author's earlier quantitative and qualitative study of racial

the facts and applicable legal principles. They are the authoritative source of
the judges' reasoning and decision making.
100. See Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping, supra note 53, at 55-60 (describing
development of racial harassment jurisprudence). See generally Pat K. Chew,
Seeing Subtle Racism, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183 (2010) (explaining Supreme
Court principles on the harassment doctrine).
101. Chew, supra note 100, at 187.
102. Id. at 191.
103. Id. at 187.
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harassment cases in the federal courts revealed a range of
information.'04 The study included randomly selected cases from six
representative federal circuits over a twenty-two-year time period.0 5
It found that employee plaintiffs were successful 22% of the time,
In
indicating that employees fared poorly in these lawsuits.
case
to
related
were
addition, some judge and case characteristics
outcomes. In particular, the judges' race (but not the judges'
gender), the judges' political affiliation, and whether supervisors
and coworkers "ganged up" on employees were predictive of whether
employees were successful.'o Furthermore, the study found that
most plaintiffs were African Americans and represented a broad
range of professional and occupational fields. 0 8
A qualitative empirical analysis of judicial opinions in these
racial harassment cases revealed patterns in judicial decision
making.'09 As expected, judges routinely cited case precedents and
legal principles, both parties commonly had legal representation,
and court opinions referenced legal briefs and other documents.
TABLE 1
Qualitatitve Analysis: Comparing Decision-Making Patterns

Judges
* Citing of legal standards, precedents
* Paradigm of Racial Harassment as only "old-fashioned
racism"--discounting modern, subtle racism
* Staging with lawyer, legal documents
The author's study of judicial opinions also revealed some
1
striking patterns in how judges interpreted legal principles. o These
patterns helped explain why employees were so likely to lose. Social
scientists have found that racism in the contemporary American
workplace can be explicit and blatant (sometimes called "oldfashioned racism") or more subtle, implicit, even unconscious bias
(sometimes called "modern racism")."' Examples of old-fashioned
racism are blatant racial slurs or racist objects (such as nooses,
white robes, or pointed hats). Examples of modern racism are
104. See Chew & Kelley, Color-Blind Judge, supra note 53; Chew, supra
note 100; Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping,supra note 53.
105. Chew & Kelley, Color-BlindJudge, supra note 53, at 1138.
106. Id. at 1143 tbl.3. A plaintiff "win" means the plaintiff was successful in
the proceeding before the court, which most typically was based on the
employer's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1138 n.119.
107. Id. at 1143 tbl.3. Plaintiffs were also significantly more likely to win
when judges were African-American than when they were white. Id.
108. Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping,supra note 53, at 66 tbl.3.
109. Chew, supra note 100, at 281 n.210.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 216-17.
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exclusion from professional and social networks, unconscious
stereotyping, or intimidation and insults that do not contain blatant
racist slurs." 2 An analysis of the content of judicial opinions
indicates that judges generally associate legally cognizable racial
harassment only with old-fashioned racism."3 Moreover, even when
employees have evidence of old-fashioned racism, many courts
impose further requirements, a kind of "racism-plus" requirement." 4
For example, for plaintiffs to succeed in many courts the racism
must be in the employees' presence and directed at them,
particularly
egregious
and
offensive
(including physical
confrontation), and very persistent and frequent. While some judges
do recognize modern racism, they are in the vanguard." 5
C.

Racial HarassmentArbitrationCases
Unlike federal court judicial opinions, no formal comprehensive
reporting system of arbitral opinions for employment disputes
exists. The AAA and LexisNexis, however, now offer a searchable
and comprehensive database of AAA employment arbitral opinions
("AAA-Lexis Database")." 6 Given the otherwise confidential world of
arbitral opinions, this source provides an invaluable window into
arbitral proceedings. The opinions do not reveal the identities of the
parties or other identifying information, but are otherwise complete.
These arbitral opinions are a valuable supplement to the AAA
reports filed in compliance with California 1281.6."
Given the availability of the AAA-Lexis Database, an
exploratory quantitative and qualitative study of arbitral decision
making in racial harassment disputes is now possible. Searching
the database, nineteen cases were identified." 8 Given the relatively
small number of opinions, the quantitative analysis is limited, and
its results should be generalized with considerable caution. In
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 206.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 217.

116. According to Ted Pons, Vice President, Publications and ADR

Resources, American Arbitration Association, this database includes all AAA
employment awards issued from 1999 through the present. The awards are full
text (except for redacting to protect the confidentiality of the parties). Since
employment awards are "reasoned awards," there is an opinion written for
every award that details the arbitrator's reasoning process in arriving at the
award. E-mail from Ted E. Pons, Vice President, Publ'ns & ADR Res., AAA to
Pat K. Chew (Oct. 5, 2010) (on file with author).
117. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
118. Using the search term "racial harassment," there were twenty-five case
hits, and nineteen of these involved employees' racial harassment claims. As a
comparison, these terms had the following number of case hits: "sexual
harassment," 253; "sex discrimination," 84; "race discrimination," 134;
"wrongful discharge," 167; and "age discrimination," 235. Search executed on
Oct. 26, 2010.
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contrast, qualitative analysis can yield meaningful information even
when the sample is small, especially given that every available
racial harassment opinion in the AAA-Lexis Database is included in
the study. This qualitative analysis illustrates a novel form of
empirical research of arbitration cases, complementing the results of
the quantitative research provided below.
1. Descriptiveand QuantitativeFindings
As was the case in racial harassment court cases, the race of
9
employees in these arbitrations was typically African American.
Furthermore, their allegations represented a wide range of
harassments including old-fashioned egregious racism as well as
modern racism.120 In contrast to the court cases in which plaintiffs
had a variety of jobs including professional and management
positions, 2 employees in arbitrations tended to have lower-level
In addition, arbitrations are typically the final
positions.122
resolution of the dispute, rarely reviewable, and not appealable. In
contrast, the litigation studies are based on judicial opinions, which
are predominantly based on employers' pretrial motions for
summary judgment.123

119. Ninety-one percent of employees whose race was identified (ten of
eleven) were African American.
120. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing old-

fashioned racism and modem racism).

121. See Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping,supra note 53, at 66 tbl.3.
122. Eighty-eight percent of employees whose jobs were identified (fifteen of
seventeen) were in lower-level positions, including technicians, office support
personnel, and salespeople.
123. See Chew & Kelley, Unwrapping,supra note 53, at 78 tbl.10.
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FIGURE 2
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The employee success rate is noteworthy, even given the
previous caution about the small number of cases. Employees were
very likely to lose their racial harassment disputes in arbitral
proceedings, winning only one case out of nineteen, yielding a 5.3%
success rate. This success rate is considerably lower than the 22%
plaintiffs' success rate in court cases.124 Further, it appears that
racial harassment complainants are more likely to lose than are
employees with other complaints. Recall, for instance, that in
Colvin's study of all types of employment disputes in arbitrations,
employees won 21.4% of the time. 25
2. QualitativeFindings
As described earlier, arbitration and other ADR processes were
envisioned as less formal, less costly, and timelier alternatives to
the litigation process. 26
In addition to these procedural
characteristics, ADR also had an important substantive goal: for the
parties to tailor the process to their interests and needs and to allow
arbitrators to shape outcomes consistent with those interests and
124. Keep in mind, however, that arbitrations are final resolutions of

disputes on their merits, while the court cases in this study and other studies
on employment litigation tend to be on pretrial motions such as the employers'
motions for summary judgment. In addition, racial harassment plaintiffs must

go through a number of administrative procedures before moving ahead with a
lawsuit, while employees in arbitrations typically engage in the arbitration
process subject only to the contract terms on initiating the arbitration and do
not have to go through any administrative procedures. This may affect the
kinds of cases that end up in arbitration versus litigation.
125. See Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 38, at 6.

126. See supra Part II.B.
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needs, rather than being subject to rigid legal principles and
impersonal procedural rules required in litigation.
As revealed in this qualitative analysis, however, some striking
substantive and procedural similarities emerge between the judicial
process and the arbitral process. Arbitration in practice may not be
the procedurally or substantively differentiated process that was
originally envisioned. For instance, arbitrations now frequently
include legal counsel for parties, legal briefs, comprehensive records,
and extensive hearings. In these ways, arbitrations mimic the
formalities and lawyers' orchestration of litigation. The AAA's
Model Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, for
instance, suggest detailed procedures for jurisdiction, discovery,
appointment of arbitrators, evidence, and confidentiality.'27 These
procedures presumably help assure the parties of a fair process, but
they also likely increase the parties' expense and administrative
burdens.
TABLE 2
Qualitatitve Analysis: Comparing Decision-Making Patterns

Judges
* Citing of legal standards,
precedents
* Paradigm of Racial
Harassment as only
"old-fashioned
racism"-discounting
modem, subtle racism
* Staging with lawyer, legal
documents

Arbitrators
Citing of legal standards,
precedents
Paradigm of Racial
Harassment as only
"old-fashioned
racism"-discounting
modern, subtle racism
Staging with lawyer, legal
documents

Arbitrators' analysis of the disputes themselves also
surprisingly mirror judicial analysis in fundamental ways.
Although arbitrators are not bound to follow legal principles in their
resolution of the dispute (unless the parties have contracted
otherwise), most of the arbitrators nonetheless referred to legal
standards. For instance, 79% (fifteen of nineteen opinions) of the
arbitral opinions expressly referenced established legal principles,
noting, for instance, whether the alleged harassment was "severe or
pervasive.' 28 Some arbitrators went one step further, citing specific
legal cases or statutes as sources of authority. 2 9 Merely 21% of
cases did not refer to legal principles, relying instead only on the

127. AAA Rules, supra note 50.
128. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (describing the "severe
or pervasive" legal principle).
129. Sixty-eight percent of arbitrators cited specific legal cases or statutes in
thirteen of the nineteen opinions.
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arbitrators' observations, logic, or individual judgment.o
Moreover, arbitrators not only cite legal principles, they tend to
interpret these principles in the same way as do judges, adhering to
the same paradigm of racial harassment. Namely, they expressly
focus on old-fashioned blatant and egregious racism, while
discounting or ignoring modem racism as evidence of racial
harassment.13 1
Also, even when they noted the employees'
allegations of old-fashioned racism, arbitrators nonetheless found
them insufficient to hold for the employee. For example, in cases in
which employees complained of racial slurs (supervisors or
coworkers calling them "monkey," "nigger," or "black ass") or other
forms of explicit racism, arbitrators nonetheless concluded that
racial harassment had not occurred.'32 If anything, arbitrators were
less persuaded than judges by employees' allegations of explicit
*133

racism.

Arbitrators frequently reasoned that the harassment was not
"severe or pervasive" enough to create a racially hostile environment
for the employee. 34 In some of the cases, arbitrators expressly
doubted the employees' credibility or questioned the employees' own
subjective belief that their harassment was race based, instead
being persuaded by the employers' telling of the story.
In sum, this qualitative analysis revealed that the arbitration
process is increasingly intertwined with and has similar effects to
the litigation process. Arbitration is not really a distinct and
alternative dispute resolution system, but instead appears
increasingly coordinated with the judicial system. In some of the
cases, employees originally tried to sue their employers in court, but
130. Only four of the nineteen opinions contained no reference to legal
principles.
131. See supra Part IV.B (describing these judicial tendencies further).
132. See, e.g., 2009 AAA Employment Lexis 217, at *2-4 (Sept. 15, 2009);
2008 AAA Employment Lexis 275, at *43, *62 (Dec. 22, 2008); 2008 AAA
Employment Lexis 270, at *7-8, *73 (Aug. 21, 2008); 2008 AAA Employment
Lexis 11, at *3, *7 (Apr. 1, 2008); 2007 AAA Employment Lexis 134, at *3-4,
*22 (Aug. 2, 2007); 2000 AAA Employment Lexis 34, at *10, *17 (Sept. 7, 2000).
In the only arbitration case in which the employee won, the African American
car salesperson claimed that he had to endure racial slurs ("Little Black Sambo
with the shined shoes" and "nigger pimp") when he walked from the back of the
dealership where he parked his car through the service department, and that
African American employees were prohibited from using a grill to cook their
lunch. 2006 AAA Employment Lexis 251, at *3-4 (June 25, 2006). The
company also allegedly treated African American customers differently than
Caucasian customers. Id. at *2-3. The arbitrator concluded that the legal
requirements for racial harassment were satisfied. Id. at *10.
133. Employees lost 92% of the cases (twelve of thirteen cases) when they
claimed old-fashioned racism.
134. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing "severe or
pervasive" harassment as the applicable legal principle in these cases).
135. Twenty-one percent of arbitrators were persuaded by the employers'
story in four of nineteen opinions.
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the court compelled arbitration. Arbitrators routinely cite legal
principles and legal cases as precedents. Arbitrators resolve the
dispute and impose that resolution on the parties, and their awards
are generally not reviewable by the courts. Some arbitrators are
reaching conclusions that are ordinarily reserved for judges-for
instance, granting the employer's motion for summary judgment. 36
This qualitative analysis provides consistent evidence that
arbitrators are beginning to sound, think, and act like judges.
CONCLUSION

Legislators, employers, and employees continue to debate ADR's
benefits and potential harms, particularly for mandatory employee
arbitrations when employees are compelled to arbitrate their
disputes even though they would prefer to go the courts. Section
118 of the 1991 Act encouraged ADR's use. The Supreme Court in
Gilmer endorsed using arbitration to resolve workplace disputes.
Empirical researchers are now exploring whether ADR, particularly
arbitration, is indeed consistent with the 1991 Act's overall purpose
of further strengthening employees' civil rights or instead is
disadvantageous to employees.
This is hardly just an academic issue, given the thousands of
employment arbitrations conducted each year, including mandatory
arbitrations through employer ADR plans.
Historically,
employment arbitrations have been shrouded in secrecy, given that
arbitrations are characteristically private and confidential.
Emerging databases, however, provide a window into (1)
employment arbitration's basic characteristics, including its
outcomes, and (2) arbitral opinions. Quantitative and qualitative
empirical analyses of samples from these databases give us insight
into arbitrators' decisions and their decision-making processes.
The author's original quantitative and qualitative analysis of
racial harassment disputes contributes to this discussion, comparing
arbitration and litigation outcomes in racial harassment cases. It
found that employees fare poorly in courts (22% success rate), but
appear to fare worse in arbitrations (5.3% success rate). While there
are important differences between the cases in litigation studies and
the cases in arbitration studies, this difference in employee success
is nonetheless striking.
Moreover, this study of racial harassment disputes suggests
that arbitration is not the truly alternative process that some
envisioned-in which the parties shape the dispute process and
creatively tailor the outcome to suit their particular interests and
needs.137 In reality, it is more similar to a court-like adjudication,
136. See, e.g., 2008 AAA Employment Lexis 270, at *73 (Aug. 21, 2008).
137. Perhaps mediation, another ADR process that allows the parties to
shape their own solution, has more potential to fulfill these visions.
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with a clear winner and a clear loser. Arbitrators' decision-making
processes also mirror judges' decision-making processes, referencing
legal principles and precedents and following the same
interpretational norms. In these ways, the justice that employees
access in litigation and in arbitration is comparable.
These ostensible similarities between the two processes,
however, should not obscure inherent fundamental differences
between arbitration and litigation. For example, to state the
obvious: the decision makers in arbitration are arbitrators and the
decision makers in litigation are judges. Less obvious is that federal
judges are selected through a carefully crafted public vetting
process, whereas arbitrators are selected in much more idiosyncratic
and less transparent ways. Furthermore, judicial adjudications are
subject to appellate review, but arbitrations are typically binding
and final without recourse to judicial review. Finally, as skeptics of
ADR have pointed out, arbitration is still a privately negotiated
dispute resolution process not subject to the whole panoply of due
process protections of the litigation system. In these ways, the
justice that employees access in litigation and arbitration remains
distinguishable.
In summary, while arbitrators' and judges' decision-making
processes on their face appear strikingly similar, fundamental
differences in who the decision makers are, and differences in
procedural safeguards remain.
Furthermore, the result that
employees have a lower success rate in racial harassment
arbitrations than in litigation is noteworthy.
These findings
encourage employees to carefully negotiate their arbitration
agreements to the extent that they have the bargaining power to do
so. They also help justify why employees would continue to contest
mandatory arbitration agreements. Thus, this research does not
indicate that arbitration is beneficial to employees, as some
researchers have concluded. This research suggests instead that
further exploration into arbitration's disadvantages to employees is
merited.

